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Abstract 
The literature on indirect tax reforms in pollution-ridden economies is quite limited. 
This paper, using a general model of a perfectly-competitive small open economy 
with both production and consumption generated pollution,  considers the welfare 
implications of tax reforms that take the structure of consumption and production 
taxes toward uniformity. Specifically, both in the presence and absence of a binding 
government revenue constraint, we derive sufficient conditions for welfare 
improvement in the case where we implement (i) reforms in either production or 
consumption taxes,  and (ii) reforms in both consumption and production taxes. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past couple of decades there has been a general consensus regarding 
the reforms of national tax systems. International institutions, e.g., the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank, encourage governments to reform their indirect and direct tax 
structure in a way of reducing economic distortions, improving welfare and possibly 
ensuring higher levels of government tax revenues.
1
 Amongst the various types of 
recommended reforms, two seems to stand out. First is the need of countries to reduce 
their reliance on discriminatory trade taxes and switch to domestic taxes such as 
income taxes and consumption taxes.
2
 The second class of recommended reforms 
involves just domestic taxes such as the movement of taxes towards uniformity.  
Motivated by such developments in the policy arena, a voluminous academic 
literature on tax reforms has been developed examining a wide range of reforms in 
direct and indirect taxes. This paper is not about the first type of reforms mentioned 
above,
3
 but about the second type.  Within the class of reforms of domestic taxes, 
there are many subclasses. A strand of this literature examines the relationship 
between direct and indirect taxes (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976); 
another examines the movement from destination to origin principle of commodity 
taxation (see, for example, Lockwood et al., 1994 and Keen and Lahiri, 1998); a third 
examines the implications of moving domestic taxes on different goods towards a 
uniform rate (se, for example, Hatta, 1977, 1986).
4
  
Specifically of interest to our study is the literature that considers the implications 
of a move towards uniformity of domestic taxes across goods. The origins of this 
                                                 
1
 This latter concern becomes even more important for revenue-strained developing economies. 
Achieving these two goals, countries are able to attain a so-called “double-dividend”. That is, a tax 
system which improves welfare and does not reduce tax revenues.  
2
 According to the World Bank (2002), during the 1990s in low- and medium-income countries, the 
share of domestic indirect taxes (i.e., taxes on goods and services) in total current government revenue 
rose from 26 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 1999. During the same period the share of trade taxes fell 
from 17 percent to 9 percent. 
3  The literature here is quite substantial and growing. See. For example, Diewert et al., 1989;  Michael 
et al., 1993; Hatzipanayotou et al., 1994, Abe, 1995; Neary, 1998; Keen and Ligthart, 2002; Lahiri and 
Nasim, 2005; Emran, 2005;  Emran and Stiglitz, 2005;  Boadway and Sato, 2009. All the above studies 
examine the welfare and revenue implications of domestic and/or trade tax reforms in the context of a 
static general equilibrium model of a small open economy. Among others, Majumdar (2004), Keen and 
Ligthart (2005) and Naito and Abe (2008) examine the welfare implications of indirect tax reforms 
under a revenue neutrality constraint in the context of imperfect competition. Naito (2005 and 2006) 
examine dynamic policy aspects, e.g., the growth rate of output, of such tax reforms.  
4
  There is also a large literature on the uniformity of domestic taxes across tax jurisdictions ---the 
issue of tax harmonization --- starting with the seminal work by Keen (1987), and on the uniformity of 
domestic environmental taxes across heterogeneous firms within an industry (see, for example,  
Fullerton et al., 2008). 
 
 2 
literature dates back to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who show that, when income tax 
is set optimally, differential commodity taxation is inefficient.
5
 Hatta (1977) in the 
context of a closed economy and without considering a binding tax revenue 
constraint, examines the welfare implications of moving consumption taxes towards 
uniformity, while Hatta (1986), re-examines the implications of the above tax reforms 
under a revenue constraint. The broad argument here is that non-uniformity in 
commodity taxation distorts consumption choices and therefore is inefficient. A move 
toward this type of uniformity is also a live issue in the policy-making sphere (see, for 
example, The European Union, 2010). 
During the past few decades most countries including many developing ones -- 
e.g., the so-called BRICS countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -- 
have enjoyed a speedy and strong growth. For theorists and policy makers, however, 
this process of economic growth has raised a number of serious concerns. Among 
those foremost is the threat to the quality of the environment due to the intensification 
of economic activity. To deal with these concerns, a new strand of the tax reform 
literature has been developed, which examines the implications of changes in the 
structure of indirect taxes in the context of pollution ridden open economies. Among 
others, Copeland (1994), Beghin et al. (1997), Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004), 
Kayalica and Kayalica (2005) consider the welfare and environmental implications of 
reforms in trade and domestic taxes in economies where pollution is a by product of 
the production and/or consumption. This literature however does not account for a 
binding government revenues constraint,
6
 Beghin and Dessus (1999) being a notable 
exception.
7
 To the best of our knowledge there are no studies on the reforms of 
domestic indirect taxes --- particularly on the movement toward uniformity of 
                                                 
5
 Kaplow (2006) shows that the Atkinson-Stiglitz(1976) result can hold even when income tax is not 
optimal. 
6
 A different literature examines the so-called double-dividend hypothesis of green tax reforms, 
whereby pollution taxes simultaneously corrects for the pollution externality and raises government 
revenues, e.g.,  Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994)  Goulder (1995) 
and Bovenberg (1999) provide various meanings of the term “double-dividend” and extensive surveys 
of this literature. Finally, a different framework of pollution tax reforms is developed by 
Hatzipanayotou et al. (2005) who in a two-country model with cross-border pollution and public 
pollution abatement, examine the welfare implications of selected multilateral environmental policy 
reforms.   
7
 Beghin and Dessus (1999), show that piecemeal tax reforms that reduce domestic relative tariffs 
towards uniformity and increasing emissions taxes proportionally, improve welfare, reduces  pollution, 
without deteriorating government tax revenues.  
 
 3 
domestic indirect taxes across goods --- in the presence of pollution and government 
revenue constraint. 
This paper considers reforms of indirect taxes along the lines of the literature on 
tax reforms in pollution ridden economies. The present study, however, extends the 
above literature in two ways. First, although our analytical framework is one of an 
open economy, we depart from the standard paradigm of reforms in domestic vs. trade 
taxes by considering reforms of only domestic taxes and consider reforms that move 
production and consumption taxes toward uniformity across goods. Such a framework 
could be more relevant since trade barriers have been rapidly going down. Second, 
and in contrast to the bulk of the relevant literature, the proposed tax reforms also 
account for a binding government revenue constraint.  
To this end, we consider a small open economy where pollution is generated 
either by production or by consumption, and where the government raises revenue by 
imposing production and/or consumption emission taxes. We consider the cases 
where government revenue constraint is binding as well as when it is not binding. 
Under these different scenarios, we derive sufficient conditions for welfare 
improvement in the specific types of reforms mentioned above; we consider reforms 
of consumption taxes and production taxes on their own and also the case when both 
types of taxes are reformed at the same time. 
8
 
 
2. The General Model 
We consider a small open, perfectly competitive economy which produces and 
consumes K internationally traded goods. There are K  types of pollutants associated 
with the production or consumption of these goods. The country is endowed with the 
inelastic supply of M primary factors, denoted by the vector v .  
Pollution is modeled as a by-product of both production and consumption. The 
production or consumption of each commodity generates a different type of pollutant 
which affects negatively the households’ utility. Consumption and production taxes 
are levied by the government to discourage respectively pollution-generating 
consumption by the country’s households and pollution-generating production by the 
producers. All tax revenues are lump-sum distributed to domestic households.    
                                                 
8
  We do not consider the distributional implications of the reforms. See, for example, Saez (2002) for 
an analysis of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) results in the presence of heterogeneous consumers.  
 4 
The country is a price taker in world commodity markets.
9
 The international 
prices of all goods are assumed to equal unity, and are denoted by the price vector
*
(11...1)p , a (1 )K vector of unit-scalars.
10
  
The economy’s production side is represented by the revenue function ( , )R q v
which captures the economy’s maximum revenue from production of the 
internationally traded goods with vector of factors [ ]v and vector of producer prices  
q , where 1
j j
q t is the domestic producer price of the 
th
j commodity and 
j
t is the 
specific production tax levied on it. For the rest of the analysis, since the vector of 
factor endowments v remains unchanged, the revenue function is denoted by ( )R q . 
The ( )R q function is assumed convex and homogeneous of degree one in producer 
prices. By the envelop theorem ( / )
jq j
R R q is the supply function of the 
th
j good.  
 Turning to the demand side of this economy, it comprises of identical 
households who consume the K  commodities, and whose utility is adversely affected 
by production and consumption generated pollution. A representative household’s 
preferences are captured by the expenditure function ( , , , )E p z r u  denoting the 
minimum expenditure on private goods achieving a certain level of utility ( )u , at 
consumer price vector p and vectors of production pollutants z  and consumption 
pollutants r . The domestic consumer price for the 
th
j  commodity is 1
j j
p , where 
j
denotes the specific consumption tax levied on it. The ( , , , )E p z r u function is 
increasing in u , in levels of pollution z and r , and non-decreasing and concave in 
p.
11
 The derivative /
jp j
E E p is the compensated demand for the j
th
 good and
p p
E
is a ( )K K negative semi-definite matrix. The derivative 
u
E  captures the inverse of 
the marginal utility of income. The derivative 
jz
E  and 
ir
E , respectively, denote the 
marginal damage caused by the pollutant
j
z or 
i
r , and thus they represents the 
household’s marginal willingness to pay for its reduction (e.g., see Copeland, 1994).  
                                                 
9
 We follow a standard practice of the literature of indirect tax reforms, which, by and large, for 
analytical convenience confines the analysis of such tax reforms in the context of small open 
economies, i.e., terms of trade considerations, are unaccounted for.    
10
 A prime ( ) denotes a transposed vector or matrix. 
11
 The (.)E function is increasing in z or in r since an increase in any type of pollutant is assumed to 
harm the households’ utility. Therefore, to attain a given level of utility, u , private spending on 
consumption must rise.  
 5 
Let, ( )
jj j q
z R q and ( , , , )
jj j p
r E p z r u , respectively denote the levels of 
pollution associated with the production and consumption of the thj good. The scalars 
0
j
and 0
j
denote, respectively, the units of production and consumption 
pollution per unit of the 
th
j commodity.   
The government’s tax revenue, ( )T , which is distributed to households in a 
lump-sum fashion,  equals the sum of consumption and production tax revenues, i.e.,  
 
1 1
( , , , ) ( ) ( , , , ) ( )
j j
K K
p q j p j q
j j
T E p z r u t R q E p z r u t R q ,                     (1) 
where 
p
E  and 
q
R , respectively, are the vectors of compensated demand and supply of 
goods. The country’s income-expenditure identity requires that private spending on 
goods must equal income from production plus income from government taxes. Thus, 
the country’s budget constraint is given as follows:   
   
 ( , , , ) ( ) ( , , , ) ( )
p q
E p z r u R q E p z r u t R q .                                                (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are the main equations of the model. They are used to 
examine the welfare implications of reforms in production and consumption taxes 
under two scenarios, with and without government revenue constraint.   
We conclude this section by deriving the effects of changes in production and 
consumption taxes on the levels of welfare and government revenues. Differentiating 
equation (2), we obtain: 
ˆ ˆ
u r p z q
E du E dE t E dR ,                                                       (3)  
where, a “hat” over a variable denotes a diagonal matrix. Thus, ˆ and ˆ , respectively 
are ( )K K diagonal matrices whose elements indicate the amount of production and 
consumption pollution per unit of the 
th
j output. Also,
 12
    
                                                 
12
 Subscripts on the functions, i.e., , , ,
j i j j j j jp p p z p r p u
E E E E  and 
j nq q
R  denote partial derivatives. For 
example, /
j i jp p p i
E E p , /
j n jq q q n
R R q . It is to be noted that 0( 0)
j ip p
E  if the 
th
j  and  
th
i  
goods are substitutes (complements) in consumption, , ,
jp u
E j K  is positive assuming that all good 
are normal in consumption, and 0( 0)
j nq q
R  if the 
th
j  and 
th
n goods are substitutes (complements) 
in production.  
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p pp pr pz pu
dE E d E dr E dz E du ,    and                                                  (4) 
 
q qq
dR R dt .                                                                                                  (5)  
 For the rest of the analysis, we assume, for simplicity, that goods and clean 
environment are independent in consumption, i.e.,
 
0
pr pz
E E .
13
  
Equation (3) can be rewritten so as to capture the welfare effect of changes in 
a single consumption tax, say that on the 
th
i  good, and of changes in a single 
production tax, say on the 
th
n good. That is:
 14
 
 
1 1
( ) ( )
j j i j j n
K K
j j r p p i j j z q q n
j j
du E E d t E R dt ,                              (6) 
 
where 
1
( )
j j
K
u j j r p u
j
E E E , it is assumed positive and this is the standard 
practice in the tax reform literature. It represents the general equilibrium inverse of 
the marginal utility of income; inclusive of feedback via consumption taxes and 
consumption generated pollution. Equation (6) can be further elaborated on by using 
the properties of the expenditure and revenue functions that compensated demand and 
supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. Specifically, 
1
0
j i
K
j p p
j
p E  and
1
0
j n
K
j q q
j
q R , respectively, yield /
i i j i
K
p p j i p p
j i
E p p E  and
/
n n j n
K
q q j n q q
j n
R q q R . Note that 1
k k
p , 1 ,
k k
q t  , ,k j i n , and by the 
                                                 
13
 In the analysis to follow we assume 0
pr pz
E E  while 0
pu
E . Suppose that the direct utility 
function has the following form 
1
( )
a a
u y x z  where ( , )x y  is the vector of consumptions of the two 
goods and z  is the level of pollution. It can be shown that the expenditure function in this case is
1
( , , ) (1 )
a a a
E p u z a a p u z , where ( / )
y x
p p p . Clearly, this expenditure function satisfies 
0
pz
E and 0
pu
E . The assumption that the demand for private goods is independent of the 
environmental quality is often made in the literature (i.e., Bovenberg 1999, Beghin and Dessus 1999). 
Wilson (1991) provides an example of a direct utility function and Copeland and Taylor (2004) an 
example of an indirect utility function which gives uncompensated demand functions for goods 
independent of public good and pollution, respectively.  
14
 In this case, equation (3) is
1 1
( )
j j j j
K K
j j r p j j z q
j j
du E dE t E dR . Simple algebra, using the 
relevant equations (4) and (5), and assuming that 0
j j j jp r p z
E E , result in equation (6).  
 7 
reciprocity conditions 
k j j kp p p p
E E and 
k j j kq q q q
R R . Using the above properties and 
after some manipulations, we obtain: 
( ) ( )
j i j n
K K
j i j p p i j n j q q n
j i j n
du p E d s s q R dt .                                    (7)                                                                                                                                                                   
 
We call the ratio ( ) / ,
kk k k r k
E p  the rate of excess taxation of 
consumption-pollution, which can be positive or negative depending on whether the 
consumption tax exceeds or falls below the marginal willingness to pay for reducing 
pollution due to consumption of a unit of the 
th
k  good.
15
 Similarly, the ratio 
( ) /
k
k k k z k
s t E q  is called the rate of excess taxation of production-pollution, 
which can also be positive or negative depending on whether the production tax 
exceeds or falls below the marginal willingness to pay for reducing pollution due to 
production of a unit of the 
th
k good.   
When government revenue constraint is binding ( 0dT ), differentiating 
equation (1), using equations (4), (5), and the homogeneity properties of the 
expenditure and revenue functions, we obtain: 
 
1
i j i
K
i
i p j i p p
j i i
d
du p E E 0
1
n j n
K
n
n q n j q q
j n n
dt
q R t t R
t
,       (8)                       
 
where, 
1
j
K
j p u
j
E  and it is positive assuming that goods are normal in 
consumption.  
Equations (3) and (7) are relevant for examining the welfare implications of 
the indirect tax reforms assuming a non-binding government revenue constraint. The 
system of equations (3), (7) and (8) are used to examine the welfare implications of 
indirect tax reforms under a binding government revenue constraint.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 Note that 1 1 ( / )( / )
k kk r k k k k p
p E p E r r E is the amount by which consumers need to be 
compensated in order to keep utility constant due pollution generated by a Euro’s worth increase in 
consumption of the 
th
k  good. /
k k
p is the ad-valorem equivalent of the specific consumption tax 
k
on the  
th
k  good.   
 8 
3. Reforms without a binding government revenue constraint 
In this section, we assume away the existence of a government revenue 
constraint and examine the welfare implications of reforms in consumption taxes and 
in production taxes.  We consider these one at a time, but in the presence of both 
types of pollution and both types of taxes.   
 
3.1 Reforms in consumption taxes 
In this subsection we derive the conditions under which welfare improves by 
increasing or decreasing the consumption tax on a certain good. In this exercise we do 
not consider changes in production taxes whose non-zero levels are held constant. 
With this in mind, whether there exist production generated pollution and/or 
production taxes does not affect the results to follow. Since production taxes do not 
change, equation (7) reduces to: 
 
1
( )
j j i j i
K K
j j r p p i j i j p p i
j j i
du E E d p E d .                                (9)             
 
The following proposition which is derived from equation (9), states sufficient 
conditions for welfare improving consumption tax reforms. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume the existence of consumption and production generated 
pollution. Suppose that the 
th
i good carries the lowest (highest) rate of excess taxation 
of consumption-pollution relative to all other goods i.e., ( ) 0( 0),
j i
 .j K
Then, a small increase (decrease) of the consumption tax on this good, improves 
social welfare if the 
th
i  good is a substitute in consumption with all the other goods.  
 
Note that the results of the above proposition do not depend on whether the 
rate of excess taxation is positive or negative.  The reforms described by the above 
proposition aim at small increases or decreases of consumption tax rates so that the 
rates of excess taxation of consumption-pollution move towards uniformity. For 
example, in the case of the 
th
i good carrying the lowest rate of excess taxation of 
consumption-pollution relative to all other goods we propose successive small 
increases of the consumption tax on this good, so that its rate of excess taxation of 
 9 
consumption-pollution does not increase beyond the level of the second lowest rate of 
excess taxation. Intuitively, the above results can be interpreted as follows. Take the 
case whereby the 
th
i  good exhibits the lowest rate of excess taxation of consumption-
pollution, thus it is the good associated with the least distorted consumption-pollution. 
Then, increasing the consumption tax on this good so that its rate of excess taxation of 
consumption-pollution does not increase beyond the level of the second lowest rate, 
aims at bringing the consumption generated pollution distortions towards uniformity. 
This result depends on the relationship in consumption between the good with the 
lowest rate of excess taxation of consumption-pollution, and the other goods. Thus, 
assuming substitutability in consumption between the 
th
i good and the other goods,
 
an 
increase in the consumption tax on the 
th
i  good reduces its consumption and pollution 
distortion and raises the consumption and pollution distortion generated by all other 
goods. An analogous argument holds when the 
th
i  good exhibits the highest rate of  
excess taxation of consumption-pollution, and the consumption tax on this good is 
reduced in such a way that, its rate of excess taxation of consumption-pollution does 
not fall below the level the second highest rate. 
Comparing the above results to standard results of the literature on reforms of 
tariffs and consumption taxes we note the following. Michael et al. (1993) conclude 
that if, for example, the 
th
i  good is burdened with the highest (lowest) consumption 
tax rate, then, reducing (increasing) this tax rate to the level of the next highest 
(lowest) consumption tax rate, unambiguously improves the country’s welfare if the 
th
i good is a substitute to all other goods in consumption (Proposition 1, p. 421). This 
result seizes to hold when introducing consumption generated pollution. As shown 
above, a welfare improving reform of consumption taxes requires increasing 
(decreasing) the consumption tax on the commodity exhibiting the lowest (highest) 
rate of excess taxation of consumption-pollution, without inferring that this 
commodity is the one that is also burdened with the lowest (highest) consumption tax 
rate. In the presence, however, of only production generated pollution, then the 
welfare effects of a consumption tax reform go through as originally stated by 
Michael et al. (1993) and others.  
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3.2 Reforms in production taxes 
We now derive the conditions under which welfare improves by increasing or 
decreasing the production tax on a certain good.  In this exercise we do not consider 
changes in consumption taxes whose non-zero levels are held constant. Whether there 
exist consumption generated pollution and/or consumption taxes does not affect the 
results to follow.
16
  Since consumption taxes do not change, equation (7) reduces to: 
1
( ) ( )
j j n j n
K K
j j z q q n j n j q q n
j j n
du t E R dt s s q R dt .                             (10) 
Using equation (10), in the following proposition we state the sufficient 
conditions for welfare improving production tax reforms. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume the existence of consumption and production generated 
pollution. Suppose that the 
th
n good carries the lowest (highest) rate of excess 
taxation of production-pollution relative to all other goods i.e., ( ) 0( 0),
j n
s s  
j K . Then, a small increase (decrease) of the production tax on this good 
improves social welfare if the 
th
n  good is a substitute in production with all other 
goods.  
 
Note that the results of the above proposition do not depend on whether the rate 
of excess taxation is positive or negative. The welfare improving reforms described 
by the above proposition aim at small increases or decreases of production tax rates so 
that the rates of excess taxation of production-pollution move towards uniformity. 
The intuition of these results follows the previous discussion of small reforms in the 
consumption tax rates.
17
,
18
  
 
                                                 
16
 The size of is different if consumption taxes are zero compared to the case where are not. The 
results of proposition 2, however, are the same in both cases, i.e., zero or positive consumption taxes.  
17
 When the pollution from the consumption or production of different goods is homogenous and 
pollution intensities are also the same, then the rate of excess taxation of consumption or production 
pollution is the highest (i.e., 
i
 or 
i
s is the highest) if and only if the tax rate is the highest (i.e., 
i
or 
i
t is the highest).  
18
 We can design uniform changes in all consumption or production taxes that improve welfare. For 
example, if we change all consumption taxes by the same proportion (0 1)  of the excess taxation 
of consumption-pollution, that is, ( )
ii i i r
d E , and ( )0
i
d  according to weather
( ) ( )0
ii i r
E , then a uniform increase (decrease) in consumption taxes proportional to the 
negative (positive) excess taxation of consumption pollution improves welfare. 
 11 
4. Reforms under a binding revenue constraint 
In this section we consider reforms in consumption and production taxes under 
the additional restriction that government revenue cannot change because of the 
reforms. Thus, contrary to the previous section, we can no longer consider a change in 
a single consumption or production tax but we need to consider changes in at least 
two of these taxes in order to keep government revenue unchanged.  Accordingly, we 
consider the following three reforms: (i) changing one production tax and one 
consumption tax, (ii) changing two production taxes, and (iii) changing two 
consumption taxes.  
 
4.1 Reforms in consumption and production taxes  
Equations (7) and (8) are now used to examine the welfare implications of the 
aforementioned reform programs, as well as the required adjustments in tax rates in 
order to maintain government revenue constant. To facilitate the analysis, we rewrite 
equations (7) and (8) as follows: 
 
1 1
i i i n n n
du p F d q B dt ,                                                                           (11) 
1 1
0
i i i n n n
du p G d q D dt ,                                                                      (12) 
 
where,  
( )
j
K
i i j j i p p i
j i
F p p E ,  
i j
K
i i p j i p pi
j i
G p E E ,   
( )
j n
K
n n j n j q q
j n
B q s s q R , 
n j n
K
n n q n j q q
j n
D q R t t R .  
 
We rewrite equations (11) and (12) in the following matrix format:  
 
1 1
1 1
i i n n
n
ii i n n
dup F q B
dt
dp G q D
.                                                               (13) 
 
Solving the above equation, we obtain: 
 12 
1
1
( )
i n n i i n
n
du
p q B G F D
dt
.                                                              (14) 
1
1
( ).
i
n n n
n
d
q D B
dt
                                                                       (15) 
 
We assume that both tax rates are revenue increasing, i.e., the tax rates are on the 
“right” side of the Laffer curve. This assumption implies that 1
1
( )
i i i
p G F , the 
determinant of the left-hand-side coefficients matrix in (13), is positive.
 19
 This is a 
standard assumption used extensively in the tax reform literature, e.g., see among 
others, Emran and Stiglitz (2005). The following proposition summarizes the 
conditions ensuring a welfare improvement due to an increase in the production tax  
n
t , adjusting appropriately the consumption tax
i
, so that government revenue is held 
constant.    
  
Proposition 3: Assume the existence of production and consumption generated 
pollution and that  
(i) the thn  good exhibits the lowest rate of excess taxation of production-
pollution, i.e., ( ) 0,
j n
s s j K , carries the lowest production tax, i.e., 
n j
t t j K , and it  is a substitute in production with all other goods,  
(ii) the thi  commodity exhibits the highest rate of excess taxation of 
consumption-pollution, i.e.,  ( ) 0,
j i
j K , and it is a substitute in 
consumption with all other goods,  
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 Using equation (1) and (7), we write equation (12) as
1 1
0.
i i i n n n
dT du p G d q D dt  Treating 
d u and d T as endogenous in the previous equation and equation (11), and 
i
d and 
n
d t as exogenous, it 
is shown that
1 1 1
1
( / ) ( )
i i i i
dT d p G F
 
and that
1
( / ) ( ) ( )
n n n n
dT dt q D B . Since it 
is assumed that ( / ) 0
i
dT d , and ( / ) 0
n
dT dt , then ( )
i i
G F
 
and ( )
n n
D B must be positive.  
 13 
Then, a small increase in the production tax on the 
th
n  good, while reducing the 
consumption tax on the 
th
i  good to keep government revenue constant, increases 
social welfare.
20
 
 
First of all note that condition (i) of Proposition 3 ensures that 
n
B  is negative 
and 
n
D  is positive, and condition (ii) ensures that 
i
F  is negative. Since the 
determinant 
1
 is assumed positive, then from the above it follows necessarily that 
0
i
G . These imply  (i) that in order to keep government revenue unchanged, any 
two taxes need to move in the opposite direction, i.e., for example, ( / ) 0
i n
d dt  in 
equation (15), and (ii) from (14) that an increase in tn and an associated decrease in ti  
raises welfare .  
Finally, by the same procedure, one can easily examine the welfare implications 
of consumption tax reforms (i.e., changes in
i
) while appropriately adjusting the 
production tax 
n
t  so as to maintain constant government tax revenue. For example, 
from equations (13) and under the conditions in proposition 4, we can obtain: 
 
1
2
( ) 0
i n n i i n
i
du
p q B G F D
d
,                                                         (16) 
 
where 1
2
( )
n n n
q D B is positive. Equations (16) indicate that under the 
assumptions of the model and conditions similar to ones previously described, a small 
reduction of the consumption tax
i
, so as the highest rate of excess taxation of 
consumption-pollution of this good does not fall below of the second highest rate, and 
an appropriate increase in the lowest production tax rate 
n
t  improves the country’s 
welfare and maintain constant the government revenue. 
 Next, under the constraint of constant government revenue, we identify the 
conditions for welfare improvement when the reform involves (i) only production 
taxes, and (ii) only consumption taxes. 
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 The aforementioned small increase in the production tax on the 
th
n good is such that  
n
t does not 
exceed the second lowest production tax  rate and the rate of excess taxation of production-pollution 
does not increase beyond the second lowest rate. 
 14 
 
4.2 Reforms in production taxes  
In this section, we consider changes in two production taxes, viz., for the 
th
n
and the 
th
i  good. In this case, we obtain:  
 1
3
i
n n n
n
dt
q D B
dt
,  and                                                               (17) 
1
3
( )
i n i n n i
n
du
q q B D B D
dt
,                                                                 (18) 
 
where 1
3 i i i
q D B  is positive since both production tax rates are assumed to 
be revenue increasing. Appendix (A.1) provides the relevant algebra in deriving the 
above equations.  
The right-hand-side term of equation (17), i.e., 1
n n n
q D B , is negative 
since 
n
t  is revenue increasing tax.
21
 In equation (18), the expressions 
i
B  and 
i
D for 
the 
th
i  good are similar to those for the 
th
n good. The following proposition states the 
sufficient conditions for a welfare improving increase in 
n
t , when 
i
t  is reduced so that 
tax revenue remains constant.  
 
Proposition 4: Assume the existence of production generated pollution and that 
(i) the thn  good is a substitute in production to all other goods, it exhibits the 
lowest rate of excess taxation of production-pollution, i.e., 
( ) 0,
j n
s s j K , and it has the lowest production tax, i.e., 
n j
t t j K . 
(ii) the thi good exhibits the highest rate of excess taxation of production-
pollution, i.e., ( ) 0, ,
j i
s s j K  and it is a substitute in production to 
all other goods.   
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 With changes only in production taxes alone, it can be shown that
1
( / )
n n n n
dT dt q D B .  
 15 
Then, a small  increase in the production tax on the n
th
 good and reducing the 
production tax on the 
th
i  good to keep government revenue constant, increases 
social welfare.  
 
For the small increase in the production tax 
n
t  to raise welfare the right-hand-
side term of equation (18) must be positive.
22
 Condition (i) of Proposition 4 ensures 
that
n
B  is negative and 
n
D  is positive, and condition (ii) ensures that
i
B  is positive. 
Since the determinant 
3
 and  is positive and 0
i
B , then 
i
D is positive. Therefore, 
0
n
du dt . The above proposition indicates that by moving the rates of excess 
taxation of production-pollution towards uniformity via reforms in production taxes, 
under certain conditions, increases welfare. 
 
4.3 Reforms in consumption taxes  
Finally, we consider changes in two consumption taxes and the relevant two 
equations can be obtained as follows: 
 
 1
1
( )
i
n n n
n
d
p G F
d
,                                                                       (19) 
1
1
( )
i n n i i n
n
du
p p F G F G
d
.                                                               (20) 
Appendix (A.2) provides the relevant algebra in deriving the above equations. 
Equation (19) indicates that since both tax rates are assumed revenue 
increasing, when the consumption tax rate
n  
increases, the consumption tax
i
, must 
decrease to keep revenue constant i.e., ( / ) 0
i n
d d .
23
 Using equation (20), the 
following proposition summarizes the sufficient conditions for a welfare improving 
reforms. 
 
Proposition 5:  Assume the existence of consumption generated pollution and let:  
                                                 
22
 The notion of a small increase in 
n
t is similar to that noted in footnote 20. 
23
 Following footnote (21), it can be shown that ( / ) ( )
n n n
dT d G F , which is assumed positive.  
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(i) the thn  good exhibit the lowest rate of excess taxation of consumption-
pollution, i.e., ( ) 0,
j n
j K , has the lowest consumption tax, i.e., 
,
n j
j K , and be a substitute in consumption to all other good ,  
(ii) the thi  good exhibit the highest rate of excess taxation of consumption-
pollution, i.e., ( ) 0,
j i
j K , and be a substitute in consumption to 
all other goods. 
Then a small increase in the consumption tax on the n
th
 while decreasing the 
consumption tax rate on the 
th
i  good so as to keep government revenue constant, 
improves welfare.
24
 
 
  For the increase in the consumption tax 
n
 to raise welfare the right-hand-side 
term of equation (20) must be positive. Condition (i) of Proposition 5 ensures that 
n
F  
and 
n
G  is positive, while condition (ii) ensures that 
i
F  is negative. Since,  and  
are positive, 1( ( ))
i i i
p G F is positive and 
i
F  is negative, then 
i
G  must be 
positive. Therefore, ( / ) 0
n
du d . The above proposition states that by moving the 
rates of excess taxation of consumption-pollution towards uniformity via reforms in 
consumption taxes, under certain conditions, increases welfare. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Recent developments in the theory and practice of economic policy making 
acknowledge the adverse consequences of expanded economic activity on the quality 
of environment. Such environmental degradation must then be accounted for when 
evaluating the welfare and other economic effects of various economic policies. With 
this in mind, we note that the literature on tax reforms within an integrated system of 
indirect taxes (e.g., VATs, or other domestic or trade taxes) offers, thus far, a very 
limited insight on the welfare and government revenue implications of such tax 
reforms in the presence of pollution ridden economies. Thus, in this paper we revisit 
the question of reforming the structure of indirect taxes in the presence of production 
                                                 
24
 The aforementioned small increase in the consumption tax on the 
th
n good is such that 
n
does not 
exceed the second lowest consumption tax rate, and the rate of excess taxation of consumption-
pollution does not increase above the second lowest rate. 
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and consumption-generated pollution, and we identify sufficient conditions under 
which such tax reforms improve welfare with and without a binding government 
revenue constraint. 
 The sufficient conditions under which the various tax reforms improve welfare 
with or without constant government revenue are stated in the relevant Propositions of 
the paper. Here, instead of restating these conditions, we note some analytical features 
related to our results. First, the presence of production generated pollution does not 
alter the known results of consumption tax reforms alone. Second, regardless of a 
binding revenue constraint, the proposed welfare improving reforms of production 
taxes alone, or of consumption and production taxes combined, are those bringing 
towards uniformity the rates of excess taxation of pollution. The same feature holds 
for the case of consumption generated pollution and of reforming consumption taxes 
so as to bring the rates of excess taxation of pollution towards uniformity. For 
example, consider the case of reforming production taxes alone. When there is no 
binding revenue constraint, a welfare improving reform entails increasing the 
production tax on the good exhibiting the lowest rate of excess taxation of pollution in 
a way such that this rate does not increase beyond the second lowest rate of excess 
taxation of pollution. When there is a binding revenue constraint, such a reform is 
accompanied by appropriate changes in the production tax on another commodity so 
that government revenue is kept constant. Third, regardless of the source of pollution, 
two of the critical conditions supporting the results are: (i) the relationship in 
consumption and/or production between the good whose tax is changed to all other 
commodities, and (ii) under a binding revenue constraint, all reformed taxes are 
revenue increasing.   
 
APPENDIX 
A.I Reforms in production taxes under pollution and a binding revenue 
constraint 
With changes only in production taxes 
n
t and 
i
t , equations (7) and (8) 
respectively, become: 
 
 
( ) ( )
j i j n
j i j q q i j n j q q n
j i j n
du s s q R d t s s q R d t , 
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0
1 1
i j i n j n
i n
i q i j q q n q n j q q
j i j ni n
dt dt
du q R t t R q R t t R
t t
.  (A.1) 
Equations (A.1) can be written in the following matrix system:  
 
 
1 1
1 1
i i n n
n
ii i n n
duq B q B
dt
d tq D q D
,                                                                (A.2) 
 
where the definitions for , ,
i n i
B B D and 
n
D follow those given in equations (11) and 
(12). Equations (A.2) are then used to derive equations (17) and (18) in the text. 
 
 
A.II Reforms in consumption taxes under pollution and a binding revenue 
constraint 
With changes only in consumption taxes 
n
and
i
, equations (7) and (8) 
respectively, become: 
 
( ) ( )
j i j n
K K
j i j p p i j n j p p n
j i j n
du p E d p E d , 
      
1 1
i j n j ni
i n
i p j i p p n p j n p p
j i j ni n
d d
du p E E p E E .      (A.3) 
Equations (A.3) can be written in the following matrix system: 
 
 
1 1
1 1
i i n n
n
ii i n n
dup F p F
d
dp G p G
,                                                           (A.4) 
 
where the definitions for , ,
i n i
F F G and 
n
G follow those given in equations (11) and 
(12). Equations (A.4) are then used to derive equations (19) and (20) in the text. 
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